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Abstract  
As the 21
st century unfolds, we find ourselves having to control, support, manage or otherwise 
cope with large-scale complex adaptive systems to an extent that is unprecedented in human 
history. Whether we are concerned with issues of food security, infrastructural resilience, 
climate change, health care, web science, security, or financial stability, we face problems that 
combine scale, connectivity, adaptive dynamics, and criticality.  
 
Complex systems simulation is emerging as the key scientific tool for dealing with such 
complex adaptive systems. Although a relatively new paradigm, it is one that has already 
established a track record in fields as varied as ecology (Grimm and Railsback, 2005), 
transport (Nagel et al., 1999), neuroscience (Markram, 2006), and ICT (Bullock and Cliff, 
2004).  
 
In this report, we consider the application of simulation methodologies to financial systems, 
assessing the prospects for continued progress in this line of research.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The global financial crises of the last half-decade have, understandably, prompted a degree of 
reflection and reappraisal within the financial sector, government, and academia (e.g., Farmer 
and Foley, 2009; Haldane, 2010a; Haldane and May, 2011). How might we best prevent (or 
anticipate, or ameliorate, or recover from) a recurrence of financial catastrophe at the scale 
recently witnessed? This paper considers the potential role that large-scale simulation models 
of financial systems might play in achieving this goal.  
 
The remainder of the paper will be structured in four sections. Section two will motivate and 
contextualize the need for systemic finance models and the requirements that these models 
must meet if they are to be of use. Section three will briefly outline the literature on financial 
systems simulation before examining in more detail one case study of financial systems 
simulation, Darley and Outkin’s (2007) model of the NASDAQ exchange. Finally, section four will 
identify challenges and problem issues, and assess the prospects for progress in financial 
systems simulation in the short-to-medium term.  
 
2 Large-scale financial systems simulation  
Cliff and Northrop (2011) have recently argued that “there is an urgent need to develop major 
national strategic modelling and predictive simulation capabilities” for the global financial 
markets in order to better deal with the potential for future financial disaster. Haldane and May 
(2011) have suggested that our understanding of systemic risk in financial systems could 
benefit significantly from mathematical and simulation modelling approaches developed within 
ecology, epidemiology, networks science and other complex systems fields. Farmer and Foley 
(2009) have argued that a multidisciplinary research effort into agent-based simulation models 
of financial systems is urgently required, with the aim of developing tools that can be used to 
inform government policy and the behaviour of investment banks.  
Before considering an example of this type of modelling effort more closely, we will examine 
what we might hope to gain from better models, and large-scale financial simulations in 
particular.  Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
 
2.1 Why simulate?  
One short answer is that financial institutions are complex adaptive systems (Arthur, 1989; 
Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur et al., 1997a; Blume and Durlauf, 2006) and that simulation 
modelling has become the de facto standard for dealing with the engineering, management 
and prediction of such systems. Taken together or individually, banks, mortgage lenders, 
pension funds, brokers, stock exchanges, regulatory authorities, government departments, etc., 
represent an ecology of inter-dependent complex adaptive systems (Cliff and Northrop, 2011). 
That they are complex arises as a consequence of the non-linear interactions between these 
institutions and amongst their parts. This complexity is at the heart of the difficulty that we face 
in understanding how financial interactions (e.g., particular patterns of investment) combine to 
give rise to aggregate systemic behaviours (e.g., crashes). That these institutions are also 
adaptive arises from the fact that their component parts (e.g., their people, policies, and 
positions) change in response to environmental variation through processes of competition, 
copying, etc. Amongst these changes, those that result in increased success tend to persist, 
while those that don’t do not.  
 
This combination of properties places financial systems firmly in the category of complex 
adaptive systems, alongside many other biological, social, and socio-technological systems. 
Whether considering the behaviour of living cells, neurons and brains, whole organisms, animal 
populations, and social systems, or transport networks, power networks, ICT networks, and 
cities, simulation modelling has proven to be an indispensable tool (see, e.g., work presented 
at the conference of the European Social Simulation Association, the World Congress on 
Social Simulation, and the European Conference on Complex Systems). Consequently it 
should come as no surprise to see simulation modelling promoted as an appropriate approach 
to understanding financial systems.  
 
A longer answer to the ‘why simulate?’ question requires us to break it in two. First, what ends 
are we hoping to achieve by simulating financial systems; second, why is simulation modelling 
the most appropriate means to achieve those ends?  
 
2.2 Ends  
There is considerable diversity in the intended uses of large-scale financial simulations: from 
stress-testing financial instruments or assessing the risk inherent in an investment strategy, 
through understanding the consequences of a change in regulatory policy, to anticipating the 
onset of a financial tipping point or improving fundamental understanding of the dynamics of 
the entire financial ecosystem. Here we will consider three kinds of utility that might be found in 
simulation modelling. The list is by no means intended to be exhaustive or definitive. Rather it 
is intended to indicate that different demands will be placed on simulation models dependent 
on the intended aims of the modelling enterprise: prediction vs. insight, situational awareness 
vs. scenario modelling, local tactics vs. global strategy, etc.  
 
  The dashboard: A data-driven, high-fidelity representation of the current state of 
financial systems that can be used for accurate short-term predictions of, e.g., 
systemic risk. The dashboard concept (suggested by Doyne Farmer) addresses a 
need for situational awareness that can inform real-time decision making, whether 
at the level of governments, regulators, exchanges, and national banks, or 
investors, fund managers, and individual brokers. Like the regular broadcast of 
short-term weather forecasts, the model’s output would help to guide financial 
behaviour and avoid unnecessary risk taking.  
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  The wind tunnel: An artificial environment within which to test novel financial 
instruments, algorithms, strategies and policies. Like Dashboard models, Wind 
Tunnel models place a premium on accuracy but must also be able to address 
counterfactual situations and novel scenarios that represent significant potential 
futures. Like the simulated wind tunnels used by racing car manufacturers, these 
models are intended to allow their users to explore the consequences of changes 
in behaviour or strategy without bearing the cost of implementing these changes in 
the real world. Potential uses might range from assessing the impact of a change 
in regulatory policy to assessing the properties of a novel trading algorithm.  
 
  The sandbox: A playground for learning about systems and how they behave. 
Like wind tunnels, sandboxes are for exploring possible rather than actual 
scenarios, but unlike the other two categories, the utility of a sandbox model does 
not lie in its predictive accuracy but in its ability to generate insights that improve 
the model user’s understanding of the systems being modelled. Here the role of 
the model is heuristic in that it stimulates new or better ways of thinking about the 
real world without necessarily making point predictions about the future. Uses 
might include developing methods to detect the onset of a financial tipping point, or 
a better understanding of the key factors underpinning systemic risk in a particular 
market.  
 
2.3 Means  
Why might large-scale simulation models be the most appropriate means with which to achieve 
the ends discussed above? 
  
Simulation modelling is increasingly recognised as a “third pillar” of science, alongside, 
empirical enquiry (e.g., experimentation or historical study) and rational analysis (e.g., 
mathematical modelling or logical argument). As a methodology, simulation has particular 
relevance to the study of large-scale complex adaptive systems because these systems are 
difficult and expensive to manipulate experimentally and their histories are unreliable indicators 
of their future behaviour. Moreover, idealisations of the type that are necessary to ensure 
analytically tractable mathematical models (e.g., mean field approximations, assumptions of 
equilibrium behaviour or rational action, etc.) often abstract away some of the important 
features of these systems. For instance, the behaviour of complex adaptive systems can be 
sensitive to details of their heterogeneous structure, the diversity of agencies involved, 
interaction across multiple spatial and temporal scales, etc.  
By comparison with mathematical models
1, simulations are more readily able to capture the 
richness of structure and behaviour that is characteristic of complex adaptive systems. By 
comparison with experimental studies of such systems, simulations are relatively cheap, quick, 
and flexible. However, while it is true that simulations are powerful tools for science and 
engineering, we should not overlook some key limitations.  
 
First, model richness or realism is not an unalloyed good. It may indeed be possible to build 
simulation models that capture much of the richness of the real target system and may even 
exhibit some predictive accuracy, but what is gained on the swings of richness, is often lost on 
the roundabouts of impenetrability (Di Paolo et al., 2000).  




computational machinery. Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
 
The more detailed and realistic a simulation model is, the greater the challenge of 
understanding its behaviour. While very detailed models can be implemented on powerful 
computers, and their behaviour observed, in order to understand why we see that behaviour, 
we need to penetrate the model and explicate its workings. In the limit of maximum model 
realism and richness, we may be presented with a simulation that is a perfect simulacrum of 
the real target system but is just as difficult to understand. The lesson here is that realism, per 
se, is not something to be striven for in model building. Rather than “realising” the target 
system, we should aim to “idealise” the system, but in a way that respects its most substantive 
features, properties, processes, etc. Simulations allow us to model systems without having to 
make some of the idealisations required in order to make a mathematical model tractable. 
However, some idealisation will still be required—and desired.  
 
Second, simulations are not experiments. This may seem an odd thing to point out. However, 
as simulations become increasingly realistic, they tend to take on the status of artificial worlds 
within which artificial experiments are performed leading, in extremis, some practitioners to 
imagine that the results of simulations might eventually have the same status as the results of 
experiments in the real world (Peck, 2004). For these practitioners, simulation modelling is a 
kind of experimentation in silico, taking place in a “virtual laboratory”. However, while this vision 
may be appealing, and while simulations may be very rich representations of target systems 
and may exhibit realistic behaviour that needs to be systematically explored in order to be 
understood, such explorations are not experiments on the real-world target systems being 
modelled and their results or findings are not facts about these real-world systems. Simulations 
are not able to deliver empirical facts about the world. They are able to deliver at least two 
(related) kinds of output: insights and predictions (see figure 1). Whether a model output is a 
prediction, a forecast, a hypothesis, a conjecture, an understanding, or just an idea is as much 
to do with the attitude of the modeller as the structure of the model itself and it is a fact of life 
that shades of grey separate these categories.  
 
Thus the strength of simulation modelling is not that it enables us to build models so realistic 
that they allow us access to an alternative empirical paradigm, but that it allows us access to 
an additional analytical paradigm. Simulations are flexible enough to allow us to avoid some of 
the constraints of particular mathematical models. They encourage us to reconceive the target 
systems and to idealise them in novel ways that can generate novel ideas, insights, 
hypotheses, and, where our theories are relatively secure, novel predictions (Di Paolo et al., 
2000).  
 
From this account it should be clear that simulation modelling is not an alternative to 
mathematical modelling but is simply an additional modelling tool. Indeed, there is no clear blue 
water between mathematical and simulation modelling and the two paradigms are best thought 
of as overlapping and mutually supportive approaches.  
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Figure 1: A schematic representation of the role of models in science and engineering 
that distinguishes between two kinds of model output: insights and predictions. The 
primary role of a model is often to deliver insights that shed light on a particular theoretical 
position. These insights are typically cast as hypotheses, the validity of which can be 
explored through empirical observations (e.g., experiments). The results of these 
observations may cause revisions to be made to the original theoretical position, requiring 
new models, and insights, etc. A secondary use of some models is to generate 
predictions about the world. This may occur where we have strong faith in the theoretical 
position underpinning the model. Note that there are still further reasons for building 
models (Epstein, 2008) and also that predictions derived from a model are never certain, 
even for models that are informed by well-established theories that are true to the best of 
our knowledge, and “verified” or “validated” against empirical data (Oreskes et al., 1994).  
 
2.4 Why “large scale”?  
The phrase “large-scale financial systems simulation” appears to have an immediate and 
intuitive meaning for those concerned with questions of, e.g., financial stability and systemic 
risk. However, while the term “large-scale” appears relatively straightforward, the way in which 
it is being used here is somewhat subtle and deserves some brief consideration.  
 
Clearly the term large-scale is subjective. Largeness of scale for a single day trader will not be 
the same as largeness of scale for the governor of the Bank of England. While the former might 
be satisfied by a model that includes only the most proximal factors, the latter will be interested 
in including far more of the whole financial ecosystem inside their model. One reason for using 
the term “large-scale” is to indicate that models must be large enough in their scope such that 
they treat key processes and agencies within the model rather than as an exogenous context 
represented by fixed parameters or structures (if represented at all).  
 
A model of the price dynamics of an entire stock exchange might reasonably be considered to 
be large scale with respect to a similar model of an ideal market with a pair of traders and a 
single commodity. However, if one is interested in the systemic risk for a national economy, it 
will likely be necessary to include multiple institutions and their interactions within a single 
model. The connectivity amongst the world’s financial institutions and economies already 
implies for some that the utility of large-scale simulations will only be realised when they are 
cast at a global scale.  
 
However, the scale of a model can be measured in at least two ways: the size of the target 
being modelled and the size of the model itself. Models of the UK’s banking system are larger 
scale than models of a single UK bank. However, in each case a model cast at the level of 
individual accounts and individual banking transactions is a larger scale undertaking than one 
cast at an aggregate level of description. In order to deal with systemic financial questions, 
models will need to be “large enough” in terms of both senses: scope and resolution.  
 
A consequence of this approach is that it spans or transcends micro- and macro-economics. 
Answering systemic questions of the kind that interest financial institutions and regulatory 
agencies requires both micro-resolution and macro-scope. Successful large-scale simulation 
models will bridge these levels of description, allowing answers to questions of the form: when 
and why do micro-interactions of this kind give rise to macro-phenomena of this kind? Often 
these answers will involve the identification of intermediate meso-level patterns, or 
organisations.  
 Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
3 A Case study  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive or authoritative literature review of 
large-scale financial systems simulation which is fragmented and distributed over many fields, 
including, but not restricted to economics, physics, complexity science, mathematics, and 
computer science.  
 
Interested readers are directed to classic reviews of agent-based computational economics 
due to Tesfatsion (2002) and LeBaron (2000), and more recent reviews due to Gatti et al. 
(2010) and Cristelli et al. (2011). Levy et al. (2000) also provide an overview of early work 
including that by the group responsible for the influential Santa Fe artificial Stock Market (e.g., 
Arthur et al., 1997b). The econophysics literature is reviewed by Chakraborti et al. (2010) and 
critiqued by Gallegati et al. (2006). The relevance of modelling work in this vein to policy and 
regulation is assessed by Thurner (2011). Epstein and Axtell (1996) and latterly Gilbert and 
Troitzsch (2005) are the standard texts for social simulation more generally.  
Rather than attempt another review of these literatures, this section will examine a 
representative piece of financial systems simulation modelling described in detail by Darley and 
Outkin (2007). The authors detail the conception, design and analysis of a series of 
increasingly detailed modelling studies of the NASDAQ stock exchange. The work was carried 
out between 1997 and 1998 by a small team of modellers working for Eurobios, which was 
then the UK’s foremost complex systems simulation consultancy.  
 
The models were commissioned by NASDAQ in order to better understand the potential 
ramifications of their proposed move to decimalization. At the time of the study NASDAQ trades 
were quantized in units of one sixteenth of a dollar. After decimalization was adopted this 
smallest unit of trade was reduced to one cent. The models explored what impact this structural 
change might have on the NASDAQ’s trading behaviour, making a series of predictions 
concerning, e.g., price discovery, spread clustering and volume of trade. Since NASDAQ 
adopted decimalization in 2001 five of Darley and Outkin’s (2007) six most important 
predictions have been supported while the jury is still out on the sixth.  
 
The goal here is not to provide a blow-by-blow account of the models and their predictions, but 
rather to highlight several issues which were crucial to the success of the simulations.  
 
First, it is important to note that the modelling carried out was not primarily an academic piece 
of work (although aspects of the studies were written up for publication). The research was 
commissioned by NASDAQ for the purpose of informing their medium term decision making 
regarding decimalization. The intention was not to build a general-purpose “virtual exchange”, 
nor to construct “frictionless” abstract models that shed light on academic theories. The 
provenance of the work can be seen sometimes in the practical attitude taken to the design 
and analysis of the models.  
 
Second, the scale and scope of the modelling activity is also worth commenting upon. Are 
these “large scale” simulations? While on the one hand they treat a single exchange in isolation 
from the ecosystem of financial institutions within which it operates, on the other they do 
consider a heterogeneous ecology of interacting agents and structures within the NASDAQ 
exchange and cast their model at this micro-resolution of individual traders and individual 
trades. Whether or not the term large-scale is warranted it is clear that the concerns of the 
modelling endeavour are “systemic” in that they aim at revealing the system-level impact of 
what might at first appear to be a negligible change to a low-level market structure.  
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In order to ensure that the models were fit for purpose, Darley and Outkin sought input and 
information from a wide range of actors with relevant expertise: from investors and market 
makers to NASDAQ analysts. Darley and Outkin report that this consultation was detailed and 
ongoing throughout the modelling process, citing it as a key influence on the quality of the 
resultant models.  
 
The style of modelling employed by Darley and Outkin is “agent-based”. That is, models 
comprise a population of artificial financial agents simulated within an artificial, idealised stock 
exchange. While there are many alternative modelling paradigms that might be employed, 
Darley and Outkin argue that theirs allows for the relaxation of assumptions such as equilibrium 
behaviour and perfect rationality, while allowing for the exploration of scenarios involving 
limited information, noisy behaviour, etc.  
 
Interestingly, while the agent-based approach is sometimes characterised as a single 
paradigm, the simulations reported by Darley and Outkin vary significantly in their structure and 
function. Initially, the authors report rather abstract and mathematical models of a pair of 
traders and a single commodity. These are used to explore quite fundamental questions of 
trader behaviour and to establish the feasibility of the modelling approach. The initial models 
inform the construction of larger-scale multi-agent systems in which populations of trading 
agents interact over time, giving rise to aggregate market behaviour. This type of model is the 
core of the enterprise allowing the authors to make key predictions about the systemic impact 
of decimalization. However, they go further in exploring the behaviour of realistically calibrated, 
data-driven models designed to generate results that could be compared directly with the real-
world behaviour of the market over a particular historical period. Finally, they carry out a series 
of a time-series analyses of real market data over the period during which the resolution of the 
NASDAQ moved from one eighth to one sixteenth of a dollar, using the insights from their 
models to identify phase transitions in market behaviour that may have arisen as a 
consequence of this change in granularity. What is instructive here is the full range of uses to 
which models are put and how the character (design, scale, scope, level of description, etc.) of 
the models changes to accommodate these different uses.  
 
One key aspect of the core model’s design was the inclusion of adaptive agents. While the 
models could be populated by agents that executed fixed strategies, either derived from 
interviews with real market participants, or hand-designed by the modellers themselves, the 
modellers also allowed for agents that could alter their behaviour automatically, exploring a 
much larger space of potential strategies. This innovation allowed the models to explore 
potential strategic responses to the new dynamics brought about by changes such as 
decimalization. It also ensured a degree of robustness, since the model’s behaviour was not 
reliant on the particular set of pre-specified trading behaviours coded by the modellers. It 
seems likely that this aspect of the Darley and Outkin modelling approach would be more 
generally useful in the modelling of any large-scale financial system.  
 
More prosaically, Darley and Outkin’s reports make clear the significance of inventing 
appropriate measures and visualizations of model behaviour. Where target systems (such as 
stock exchanges) are poorly understood, there will be little prior agreement on which of the 
system’s many properties are critical to understanding its behaviour. How to measure and 
represent spread clustering, for example, was an open problem at the outset of the study. In 
some respects, the development of behavioural metrics and visualizations went hand in hand 
with the design, exploration and revision of the simulation models themselves.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the simulation methodology employed by Darley and 
Outkin was not intended to preclude mathematical modelling. In fact, to some extent, Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
mathematical treatments were used as a kind of scaffolding to help erect a reasonable 
simulation (one that agreed with key mathematically modelled behaviours), while also being 
used to help unpick and understand the behaviour of the models themselves. This last issue 
deserves to be highlighted, since in some cases the results of Darley and Outkin’s simulations, 
while reported in detail, are not fully explained. In these cases, the model is shown to exhibit 
some class of behaviour under certain circumstances, reasons for this behaviour are offered, 
but conclusive explanations are left for future work. Since these explanations could have been 
fully articulated given the investment of enough time and effort, the lesson here is that getting 
to the bottom of the behaviour exhibited by models of this complexity is challenging and time-
consuming for the designers of the models, and may not be deemed sufficiently worthwhile by 
the model’s users.  
 
What we can take away from the Darley and Outkin studies is a convincing demonstration that 
it is indeed possible to build simulation models of complex adaptive financial systems, and to 
derive from them useful insights, understanding and, to some extent, predictions about these 
systems. More specifically, the studies demonstrate the value of adopting multiple 
methodologies, combining mathematical, heuristic, and data-driven approaches with particular 
value to be gained in the use of adaptive agent-based methods. What remains to be seen is 
whether their approach can scale to meet the challenge of modelling multiple interacting 
institutions.  
 
4 Prospects  
That well-founded large-scale financial systems simulations would be extremely useful if they 
existed appears incontrovertible. Such models would inform decision makers from top to 
bottom with the likely effect of strongly reducing the risk of future financial problems of many 
kinds. They would improve our ability to ensure that regulation and financial best practice 
keeps pace with technological and financial innovation. They could allow for the real-time 
management of systemic financial risk, the anticipation and avoidance of financial disaster, and 
the agile recovery from vulnerable situations. They could guide financial strategy and policy, 
e.g., allowing an assessment of the impact of high-frequency trading on market stability, or 
informing the use of “circuit breaker” action to cool down a market in order to avoid a crash.  
 
What is at issue is not the potential utility of such models but rather their feasibility. There is a 
clear short-fall between the current state of the art in financial simulation and that required in 
order to deliver the proposed models. What is the nature and extent of this gap? How might it 
be bridged?  
 
The following sections deal with a number of the most relevant issues raised and discussed 
during a period of consultation carried out for the purposes of this paper. Many of these issues 
deserve a much more thorough treatment than can be given to them here. At some stages I will 
make use of a comparison between the effort to simulate large-scale financial systems and the 
effort to model global weather (Cliff and Northrop, 2011). While I think the comparison can be a 
useful one there are obviously some key differences between weather and finance which 
means that one is rarely a straight analogy for the other.  
 
4.1 Data  
Many of the models imagined by proponents of large-scale financial simulation are extremely 
data hungry. However, the nature of the empirical data required by different modelling 
enterprises differs considerably. Some of this data is in the public domain, is collected by 
governmental regulatory bodies, or is already available from vendors for a price. However, for Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
certain types of model the relevant data is either held privately by firms, or is not currently 
collated and stored at all. In general, the technical challenges and intellectual property or 
privacy issues involved in the identification, collection, transmission, collation, storage and 
security of data relevant to large-scale financial simulation are likely to be significant.  
 
Consider a simulation model that reproduces the dynamics of, say, a real-world stock 
exchange at some relatively fine resolution. To initialise or calibrate such a model would 
require access to empirical data specifying the trading activity on the exchange being 
modelled. The resolution at which this data must be captured will depend on the intended use 
of the model. If the model is a test bed for assessing new trading algorithms, then the data may 
potentially be anonymised, aggregated, or may even be synthetic to some extent. However, if 
the model is intended to deliver an understanding of the extent and nature of systemic risk 
associated with the positions currently taken by traders using the exchange, then it is unlikely 
that aggregated, anonymised data will be sufficient. In extremis, each piece of trading data 
must be delivered to the modellers in near real-time and must fully specify the identify of all 
institutions involved, the stock, price and volume and even more sensitive data about related 
positions held by the same institutions. As the ambition of the modelling enterprise under 
consideration increases, such data demands may very quickly escalate.  
 
It might be thought that government funded public-sector modelling initiatives could solve the 
data problem through passing new legislation requiring that financial institutions take care to 
collect and store the needed data and giving powers of data access to the government-run 
modellers. While this might make life easier, it is not a silver bullet. In the United States, 
legislation has already been passed that will allow a new Office of Financial Research (OFR) to 
“ask for any data or information it wants from financial institutions in an effort to prevent or 
mitigate the next financial crisis” (Sivon and Wilson, 2010, p.15). Exactly how the OFR will 
carry out its data collection is not yet decided, but its legislated powers do not solve the entire 
problem. For example, they do not grant access to data held by companies outside US 
jurisdiction, and aggressive pursuit of data from firms within the US has the potential to drive 
away financial services that are able to relocate to territories with less onerous demands.  
 
Despite these concerns, however, while the aftermath of the recent financial disasters is still 
fresh in the minds of those involved in the financial services sector there is currently a 
significant shared will to engage with efforts that may protect organisations and reduce their 
future exposure to catastrophe. The scale and penetration of the recent problems has 
convinced many senior figures of the necessity to meet this challenge in concert. While the 
politics are undoubtedly still daunting, there has probably never been a better time to attempt 
joint action that includes some kind of central monitoring and modelling.  
 
By comparison, early efforts to model and predict the weather were also hampered by relatively 
poor resolution data capture and limited sharing of relevant meteorological data. It took a 
significant time before these efforts evolved into the “global knowledge infrastructure” that 
weather forecasting relies upon today (Edwards, 2010). Of course weather data is not as 
intrinsically private or valuable as financial data, but as Edwards makes clear in his book, A 
Vast Machine, the history of any infrastructural development “is marked by struggle”. What the 
data issue makes clear is that without substantive and long-standing engagement from a wide 
range of financial institutions, a financial knowledge infrastructure on the scale of the worldwide 
meteorological system will not succeed.  
 
4.2 Global scale  
As mentioned in the previous section, the ecosystem of financial institutions and agencies is 
global and its structural organisation cuts across national boundaries. One consequence of the Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
recent financial problems is an increased appreciation of the connectedness of financial 
systems. This connectedness has been strengthened by globalisation over the last few 
decades (itself enabled by technological advances in rapid transit and information and 
communications technology) and has had a profound effect on the way that the global 
economy behaves. The multinational scale at which many financial firms operate combined 
with the high-speed communications links that enable close interaction over vast geographic 
distances have increased the significance of the coupling between them (Haldane, 2010b).  
 
This raises the bar for financial modelling. In principle, it is no longer adequate to consider 
individual markets, or sectors of the financial services industry in isolation if one is interested in 
systemic properties such as financial stability. In practice, there is a recognition that detailed 
models of the global economy are beyond the state of the art and will be for some time, 
perhaps forever. However, this situation is not unique to finance and does not prevent progress 
being made in, e.g., ecology or earth sciences where connectivity and global scale are also 
combined. In these fields there is an acceptance that a divide and conquer approach is a 
practical necessity even if the real target system is not strictly decomposable.  
 
Again, the history of weather modelling is instructive where an initial model resolved only two 
points over Europe, and early US models in the 1950s were restricted initially to limited areas 
of integration before being expanded to eventually cover the Northern hemisphere. 
Establishing the boundary conditions for such models was initially a significant problem and a 
significant source of potential error (Shuman, 1989). Increases in computational power and 
access to data steadily reduced the error in these models even before high-resolution global 
models were achieved.  
 
While the same incremental progress is likely within financial modelling, the challenge of spatial 
scale may prove to be more severe. Two significant disanalogies between weather and finance 
are relevant here (discounting for the moment that we are not in possession of a formulation 
equivalent to the Navier-Stokes equations for fluid flow, i.e., we lack a consensually agreed 
upon fundamental theory of financial dynamics). First, fluid flows are local and low-dimensional: 
the weather in London can only influence the weather in New York by propagating that 
influence via the weather in the places in between. Second the speed with which influence 
propagates through the fluid medium is relatively slow with respect to our ability to sample it. 
Neither of these properties are true of financial systems where action at a distance through the 
use of electronic communication is the norm and influence can spread through a global 
network of automated financial agents at close to the speed of light.  
 
4.3 Modelling people  
At the heart of financial systems are people, acting and interacting in large numbers. Given that 
we would be unable to build a simulation of a single one of these people, it might appear 
hopeless to attempt the simulation of many hundreds, thousands or millions of them.  
 
The fact that people’s behaviour is poorly understood is a serious challenge to modelling many 
social systems. However, while predicting the minute-by-minute behaviour of an arbitrary 
individual in a population is perhaps impossible, at the population level people are to some 
extent predictable (the field of psychology is dedicated to articulating these regularities). In 
addition to general findings in psychology and sociology, there are three sources of data on 
human behaviour that could inform large-scale financial simulation. First, behavioural finance 
and experimental economics has a great potential to deliver relevant evidence regarding 
trading behaviour and decision making under risk and limited information. To do so, however, it 
must redirect its attention away from “throwing rocks at rational choice theory” towards 
empirical study of real financial behaviour. Second, modellers should be able to draw on Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
historical data collected from, e.g., real traders. Reverse engineering behavioural strategies 
from such data is not trivial but may be possible in some cases. Third, information extracted 
from experts through knowledge elicitation techniques may be informative, but relies on a 
degree of self-knowledge through introspection that can be problematic in some domains.  
 
One source of optimism is the restricted nature of the action set of some agents in financial 
systems. There is a difference between trying to model the people in a philosophy department 
and trying to model people on a production line. While the people in both systems are equally 
complex, the behaviour that they exhibit is not. The behaviour of people within financial 
systems sits at various points between these two extremes: some auction behaviour is 
extremely constrained, whereas the choices of regulatory authorities are much less bounded.  
 
4.4 Reflexivity  
One further disanalogy between weather and finance is especially relevant: reflexivity. Clouds 
do not pay attention to weather forecasts in order to alter their behaviour in ways that make 
them money. The fact that people attend to models of their own behaviour and may change 
that behaviour as a consequence places some unique constraints on social modelling (Lucas, 
1976). For topics as politically and financially charged as financial stability, systemic risk, etc., 
how new information arising from models is disseminated and acted upon is a key factor in 
whether the modelling effort will have been worthwhile.  
 
Consider a situation in which the output from some state-sponsored or collectively managed 
large-scale financial simulation is in the public domain. First, wide dissemination of such model 
outputs will tend to homogenise the behaviour of the relevant financial institutions since each 
will now be privy to the same information. The resultant reduction in diversity within the system 
may increase its vulnerability to shocks. Moreover, if such a simulation suggests, say, a 
change in regulatory policy on the basis that it tends to reduce systemic risk on average, but 
that this will not be true across the board, this information has the potential to change the 
behaviour of the financial institutions being modelled, possibly in ways that undermine the 
conclusions of the model and either prevent the regulatory policy changes from being made 
with confidence or lead such a policy change to have unpredicted consequences.  
 
Conversely, if the outputs of such a model were to be kept secret, in addition to potentially 
reducing the extent to which financial institutions voluntarily engage with the modelling 
enterprise, and preventing some of the potential uses for a simulation facility, this would create 
a situation of intrigue, speculation, and possibly competition amongst institutions to develop 
their own modelling resource with which to second guess the moves made by authorities, 
competitors, etc.  
 
This mixture of logistics, politics, psychology and money is complicated and a clear way 
forward is unclear. However, to some extent there are precedents for this type of problem in 
that, e.g., any regulatory body has to engage with the issue that changes in regulation bring 
about changes in behaviour. In fact, if a concerted attempt to model financial institutions and 
how they interact draws attention to the role of innovation and adaptation in the behaviour of 
organisations and individuals, this may be a significant positive outcome.  
 
Consequently, while there are certainly some pitfalls here that mitigate against long-term 
predictive modelling, the Lucas Critique (Lucas, 1976) and similar concerns are not considered 
to be show-stoppers for large-scale financial simulation in general, since the “adaptive 
capacity” of the systems being modelled (i.e., the ways in which systems and behaviour 
change in response to changes in their environments) will likely tend to be a central concern of 
the models (e.g., Darley and Outkin, 2007).  Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
 
4.5 Computational power  
It should be clear that significant computational power will be required in order to resolve the 
large-scale simulation models that are being discussed here. Simply collating and storing the 
relevant real-time data that would be used to calibrate or initialise some of the models 
represents a significant effort and demands considerable computational resource and 
infrastructure. Executing models that are cast at a fine resolution and at a significant, perhaps 
global, scale will also be computationally demanding.  
 
However, the scale of computational effort required to drive the models being imagined by 
proponents of large-scale financial systems is entirely feasible using current technologies. 
Combining large numbers of multi-core processors into computer clusters that are able to 
communicate rapidly and to decompose and share the computational load imposed by 
simulation runs is normal practice in many areas of the physical and life sciences.  
 
However, while the demand for raw computational power is not prohibitive, there remain some 
potential issues surrounding the scale at which large-scale financial simulations are expected 
to be implemented (assuming for the moment that they can be conceived and designed). 
Principle amongst these are the challenges of data management and system visualization.  
 
The scale and sensitivity of the data that may be collected from financial institutions and 
governments presents a technical challenge in terms of ensuring that this data remains secure 
and up to date, maintaining its integrity and provenance. In particular, there will be complicated 
issues to resolve before incoming streams of data can be aggregated or fused without 
compromising the intellectual property rights or anonymity constraints of the data providers.  
 
By system visualization, I am referring to any attempts to present the workings or results of the 
simulation model for users. Given that these users may range from software engineers and 
modellers involved in building and executing the models, through analysts and finance experts, 
to policy makers and regulators, it should be apparent that there is unlikely to be a single best 
choice regarding which aspects of the model to represent and how to represent them. In 
general our ability to successfully visualize the behaviour of complex models has lagged 
behind our attempts to build them (Bullock et al., 2006). If large-scale simulations of financial 
systems are to have significant impact on our decision making and policy formulation, then the 
output of these models needs to be intelligible and compelling.  
 
4.6 Underpinning theory  
Our failure to anticipate the recent global downturn and the lack of consensus on the best 
measures to take in coping with it have revealed a short-fall in our theoretical grasp of the way 
that modern financial institutions behave and interact. This short-fall has the potential to retard 
the rate at which we can achieve effective large-scale financial systems simulations.  
 
Writing at the end of the nineteenth century, Thorstein Veblen (1898) had already identified that 
economics lacked a theory of the “economic life process” with which to organise and 
understand economic behaviour as it unfolded in the real world. In place of such a “systemic” 
theory, economics had constructed “narrative”, “historical” or “taxonomic” accounts that left 
economic behaviour divorced from the phenomena studied by adjacent disciplines such as 
psychology, politics and sociology.  
 
Opinions differ on the extent to which economics and finance remain wedded to a rather 
restrictive set of neo-classical theories that rely on assumptions of rational choice and efficient 
markets. However, there is a growing consensus that both fields have failed to keep pace with Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
changes in the real world. While there certainly exists current academic work that addresses 
systemic behaviour in finance and economics (“the economic life process”) outside of the neo-
classical assumptive framework it is not mainstream. Those working within this community are 
under no illusions as to how much work is required before we have a theoretical framework that 
can explain the behaviour of modern financial institutions. Understanding how these institutions 
influence one another represents a yet larger challenge given that we are not fully aware of the 
channels through which they interact.  
 
Since there is a reflexive relationship between theory and modelling it is simultaneously the 
case that (i) closing the theory gap will be necessary before mature simulation models can be 
achieved, and (ii) efforts towards building such simulation models will help to close the very 
same theory gap by driving the construction and testing of new and better theory. This kind of 
theory gap exists to a greater or lesser extent in all complex systems domains. Such a gap 
certainly existed at the outset of efforts to simulate the earth’s weather system, for instance, 
and has certainly closed substantially since that time (Edwards, 2010).  
 
Consequently, acknowledging the inadequacy of current theory is not a show-stopper for 
progress in large-scale financial simulation, but rather might be interpreted as an impetus for it.  
 
4.7 A Grand challenge  
Grand challenges are familiar within the physical and life sciences where they have been used 
to organise significant multinational research effort around a coherent shared aim. Facilities 
such as CERN and the Large Hadron Collider and less centralised activities such as the 
Human Genome Programme have successfully mobilised scientific communities, achieving 
more clearly defined problems, and bringing about research collaborations that often span 
disciplines as well as research organisations.  
 
Given the scale and criticality of the problems posed by our financial systems, and the multi-
disciplinary nature of the proposed solutions, the grand challenge route would seem to be a 
natural one to take. This is only reinforced when some of the attendant benefits are considered. 
Notice that these benefits derive from making a serious attempt to meet the grand challenge, 
irrespective of whether this attempt succeeds or not. Consequently, we might imagine one or 
more grand challenges along the following lines: “Build a useful global simulation of the world’s 
financial ecosystem”, “Build a global systemic risk dashboard”, “Build a platform for road-testing 




First, such an attempt would likely help to weaken some of the fortifications that have tended to 
be erected around the many sub-communities within economics and finance, and also those 
that separate these communities from relevant research activity in adjacent disciplines. A grand 
challenge along the lines being considered here would tend to bring about more cross-
disciplinary communication and collaboration between fields relevant to the problem of 
understanding financial systems: economics and finance, but also parts of computer science, 
mathematics, physics, social science, psychology and complexity science. By the same token, 
a concerted effort to address the modelling challenges discussed in this paper would 
necessarily engage academia with associated private sector firms, and government 
departments, both nationally and internationally.  
                                            
2 Of course the exact specification of such a grand challenge or the mechanism by which such a specification is arrived at is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but would perhaps be an interesting topic for a meeting of relevant academics and non‐
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Second, the efforts of these researchers would tend to bring about better data on our financial 
systems and better infrastructure for collecting, collating, analysing and sharing this data. The 
direct consequence will be significantly improved situational awareness and decision making. 
The detection of significant fraud, malpractice or incompetence would also be improved.  
 
Third, as discussed in the previous section, a concerted effort to deal with modern financial 
systems will stimulate better economic and financial theory.  
Of course not every grand challenge announced to the scientific community has triggered an 
explosion of brilliant breakthroughs and new triumphs. Care must be taken and there is likely 
much to be learned from past successes and failures. Particular attention might be paid to the 
“openness” of any grand challenge activity. It would appear likely that the probability of success 
is increased when the results of independent efforts taking place in parallel around the world 
tend to be shared readily rather than hidden and hoarded. This situation is made more 
complicated when there is the potential to make money or perhaps political capital from 
progress.  
 
A similar issue concerns the ownership of any useful models that might result from concerted 
activity towards meeting this as yet under-specified grand challenge. Consider that 
meteorological models have tended to be developed by governments and their results have 
tended to be disseminated in the form of forecasts that can be considered a public good. Can 
this model be expected to operate successfully for large-scale financial simulation? Would a 
subscription model be more appropriate, where payment would earn a user the right to run 
their own version of the model, exploring specific scenarios and parameterisations that are of 
most interest? While the logistics of how simulation models might be utilised may appear a little 
prosaic, the details may have a strong influence on how the models develop and on the degree 
to which private companies, academics and government liaise and collaborate.  
 
The overall costs of funding an effort along the lines described above would be significant but 
not outside the range of investment being considered by UK funding bodies
3 or the investment 
made in other national research facilities. As discussed above, there is also scope for 
spreading the cost of the enterprise across public and private sector, and thereby integrating 
the relevant activity of academic groups, the financial services industry and governmental 
departments in a more joined up fashion. Given the severity and urgency of the overall problem 
and the relatively small initial outlay required to fund exploratory work in this area, the costs 
involved should perhaps not be regarded as a significant obstacle.  
 
5 Conclusion  
It is certainly the case that financial simulations the equivalent of those used by weather 
forecasters to generate accurate short-term predictions of global weather patterns, or longer-
term climate change, are well beyond the state of the art. However, it is also true that we are 
within reach of less ambitious simulation models that would significantly improve our ability to 
cope with the challenges presented by modern finance and that achieving these simulation 
models will take us a step closer to yet more sophisticated models, and so on.  
 
                                            
3 Consider the recent moves by the Technology Strategy Board to establish Technology Innovation Centres in key areas of 
research and innovation, or UK Research Council funding programmes targetting the application of complexity science to 
domains such as energy, healthcare, etc. Prospects for large-scale financial systems simulation 
The best way forward looks likely to involve interdisciplinary scientific collaboration towards the 
development and deployment of novel simulation paradigms and new theory. This will require 
the commitment of significant computational resource and access to unprecedented quantities 
and kinds of data. Less significantly it will also require investment, likely from public and private 
sectors. The UK is well-placed to make significant progress in this activity, since it combines a 
large financial services industry with established and well-respected academic groups in 
computational finance, algorithmic trading, simulation modelling, complexity science, 
behavioural finance, and agent-based computational economics. Given this, there is 
considerable potential for gains to be made through a national effort within the UK. A multi-
national initiative between the UK and the US along the same lines has the potential to be 
game changing.  
 
We should not be blind to the size of the challenge that is entailed in building some of the 
large-scale financial simulations being imagined. Yet we should not balk at taking first steps in 
a promising new direction because the path appears to be long and difficult. This is particularly 
true given that we are likely to gain many benefits well before we reach journey’s end, and that 
staying at home has ceased to be an option.  
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